McGillBrown2007
Référence
McGill, B.J., Brown, J.S. (2007) Evolutionary game theory and adaptive dynamics of continuous traits. Annual Review of Ecology, Evolution, and Systematics, 38:403-435
Résumé
Continuous-trait game theory fills the niche of enabling analytically solvable models of the evolution of biologically realistically complex traits. Game theory provides a mathematical language for understanding evolution by natural selection. Continuous-trait game theory starts with the notion of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) and adds the concept of convergence stability (that the ESS is an evolutionary attractor). With these basic tools in hand, continuous-trait game theory can be easily extended to model evolution under conditions of disruptive selection and speciation, nonequilibrium population dynamics, stochastic environments, coevolution, and more. Many models applying these tools to evolutionary ecology and coevolution have been developed in the past two decades. Going forward we emphasize the communication of the conceptual simplicity and underlying unity of ideas inherent in continuous-trait game theory and the development of new applications to biological questions.
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@ARTICLE { McGillBrown2007,
AUTHOR = { McGill, B.J. and Brown, J.S. },
TITLE = { Evolutionary game theory and adaptive dynamics of continuous traits },
JOURNAL = { Annual Review of Ecology, Evolution, and Systematics },
YEAR = { 2007 },
VOLUME = { 38 },
PAGES = { 403-435 },
NOTE = { Times Cited: 0 },
ABSTRACT = { Continuous-trait game theory fills the niche of enabling analytically solvable models of the evolution of biologically realistically complex traits. Game theory provides a mathematical language for understanding evolution by natural selection. Continuous-trait game theory starts with the notion of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) and adds the concept of convergence stability (that the ESS is an evolutionary attractor). With these basic tools in hand, continuous-trait game theory can be easily extended to model evolution under conditions of disruptive selection and speciation, nonequilibrium population dynamics, stochastic environments, coevolution, and more. Many models applying these tools to evolutionary ecology and coevolution have been developed in the past two decades. Going forward we emphasize the communication of the conceptual simplicity and underlying unity of ideas inherent in continuous-trait game theory and the development of new applications to biological questions. },
KEYWORDS = { branching point; evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) RANDOMLY VARYING ENVIRONMENTS; ESS GERMINATION STRATEGIES; TRADE-OFF GEOMETRIES; HABITAT SELECTION; SEED SIZE; SYMPATRIC SPECIATION; DISPERSAL STRATEGIES; POPULATION-DYNAMICS; KIN SELECTION; STRUCTURED METAPOPULATIONS },
OWNER = { brugerolles },
TIMESTAMP = { 2008.02.15 },
}